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The political race for the 2016 United States President brimmed with conflict over an array of 
issues, notably Latino immigration from Mexico and Latin America to the U.S. The rhetoric of 
then Presidential Candidate Donald Trump centered around the idea that Mexico was not sending 
its finest immigrants; that, in place, they were sending rapists and criminals. This rhetoric was 
heard loud and clear and has since affected various U.S. policies and programs that actively 
exclude Latino immigrants. Using census data from 2015, rates of immigration and rates of 
violent crime were compared against 2016 election results, all at the county-level. The goal was 
to assess whether county-level rates of violent crime or the county-level rates of Latino 
immigrants were correlated with how these communities ultimately voted in the 2016 election. 
Whereas existing literature reveals overall immigrants are less likely to commit crimes than U.S. 
born citizens, this research show that counties with higher rates of immigration are more likely to 
vote Democrat, net other key predictors, regardless of crime rate; counties with lower rates of 
immigration are more likely to vote Republican, regardless of crime rate and net other key 
predictors.  
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The immigration of Latinos to the United States has long been considered a threat to the 
dominant culture, language, values, and safety (Chavez, 2020; Cervantes, 2018; Branton et al., 
2011). A narrative beginning in the early 1900s and continuing to the present, Latinos were 
framed as ‘foreigners’ and ‘aliens’ - ‘invading’, ‘flooding’, and ‘infecting’ the country. Often 
times referred to as ‘reconquistas’ by white America, it is feared Latinos will ‘reconquer’ the 
land lost during the Mexican-American war (Guardino, 1963; Chavez, 2020; Fernández, 2010; 
Lopez, 2013). This story, repeated over 100 years, has deeply impacted public perceptions and 
prejudices of Latinos overall. 
 Targeted as ‘unwilling’ to assimilate and ‘undeserving’ of opportunity, Latino 
immigrants are often considered a burden to the state and public education system. Education 
classes aimed at ‘assimilation’ to the dominant English language, such as ESL, are viewed with 
distrust. Gang, alcohol, and drug-related offenses committed by immigrants are weaponized 
politically and highlighted in the news media. Even though literature contradict this, the biggest 
perceived threat the narrative tells is that linking immigration to crime. 
    Donald Trump’s 2016 U.S. election bid was arguably the first in which immigration, 
specifically Latino immigration, was the target of a presidential campaign. Trump’s rhetoric 
decrying Latinos as rapists, bad people, and invaders was widely echoed from multiple 
platforms, including by other politicians and the news media. The focal point of rallies became 
‘build the wall’ [between Mexico and the U.S.] and the response to the ‘immigrant problem’ was 
‘shoot them’ (Chavez, 2020; Cervantes, 2018). With this rhetoric at the heart of the campaign, 
the question remains: to what extent did the Latino threat narrative affect the 2016 U.S. 
presidential election results at the county level and across all incorporated census places? Using 
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federal 2015 U.S. census data, we test whether rates of Latino immigration and rates of crime 
had an effect on political party vote, net other key predictors of poverty (food insecurity, female-
headed households, low employment, and low education). More openly, through the use of 
hierarchical multiple regression models, we explore whether local crime rate or local 
immigration rate were actually associated with how communities ultimately voted.  
Literature Review 
The Contact Hypothesis and Latino Threat Narrative  
Coined contemporarily in 1945 by Gordon Allport, the Contact Hypothesis theorizes that 
between-group contact not only tends to result in less inter-group animosity, it can also reduce 
intergroup prejudice and discrimination (Allport et al., 1954; McKeown and Dixon, 2016; 
Gaertner et al., 1996). Existing research show this increased and extended contact can lead to 
greater tolerance, reduce inter-group anxieties, and ultimately increase group salience and 
common goals (Dovidio et al., 2003; Hewstone and Swart, 2011; Turner et al, 2008). The closer 
and more situated the contact, the more accurate representation of other cultures and races 
emerge, oftentimes far removed from the stereotypes surrounding them (Ellison et al., 2011). In 
other words, communities that are more heterogenous in their ethnic will be more tolerant of 
unlike others, forming “we” mentalities and communities as opposed to “us” and “them” 
frameworks. 
Alternatively, the absence diversity in homogenous communities can lead to increased 
fear, anxiety, and decreased tolerance of unlike others. Racial prejudices are less likely to 
dimmish, as beliefs surrounding minority culture and language form without the opportunity for 
significant intergroup contact to occur, at any level (Ellison et al. 2011; Mancini et al., 2015).  
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Arising from homogenously situated and historically dominant White America, the 
Latino Threat Narrative targets both Latinos and Latino immigrants as unwilling to assimilate to 
dominant U.S. culture, politics, and language, instead forming emerging communities and social 
networks from the East coast to the West. This narrative depicts Latino immigrants as  
undeserving, illegal, burdensome, and criminal aliens (Chavez, 2020; Cervantes et al., 2018; 
Branton et al., 2011). The perceived abandonment of white American values and the white 
American dream, along with rising rates of Latino immigration to the U.S. lead to fear that 
American culture and identity were in danger (Chavez, 2020). Emerging in the 1920s, public 
discourse framed Mexican and Latino immigrants as a criminal threat; in the 1970s, they became 
‘illegal aliens’, likened to an ‘invasion’ of U.S. soil (Chavez, 2020).  
Emerging from the Latino threat narrative include misconceptions that are substantial in 
consequence. Taking this narrative at face value, Latino immigrant populations are largely 
overestimated by the public. They are oftentimes blamed for criminal violence, particularly 
including gang violence and drug trafficking, loss or lack of employment, and seen as 
burdensome to social welfare programs, the public education system, and healthcare systems in 
the U.S. (Chomsky, 2007; Tirman, 2015; Leo, 2020; Harris and Gruenewald, 2012). 
Drastically overestimating the number of immigrants in the U.S., research by Pew 
Research Center (2019) shows only 76% of respondents estimated immigrant counts to be 
between two and three times the actual figure of 12%. A majority of respondents, over 50%, also 
believed Latino immigrants held undocumented status (Pew Research Center, 2019).  
 Drug and alcohol related incidents that did involve Latino immigrants were pushed into 
the spotlight, reiterating the myth of the dangerous and violent ‘criminal immigrant’. The focus 
on arrests and deportation of members from street gangs, such as Mara Salvatrucha, commonly 
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known as MS-13, was a focal point in support of anti-immigration policies and stoked public fear 
and distrust. Crimes that are committed by Latino immigrants are headlined by politicians and 
news media, increasing fear and singling out an already disadvantaged and targeted community 
(Harris and Gruenewald, 2012). This framing has aided in negative views of Latino immigrants. 
In a recent Pew Research Center (2019) study, 33% of respondents expressed the belief Latino 
immigrants significantly increase crime (Pew Research Center, 2019).  
The narrative that immigration increases crime while decreasing job opportunities for 
citizens and harming the taxpayer is real (Davies and Fagan, 2012; McCan and Boateng, 2020). 
In a recent study by Pew Research Center (2019), 75% of respondents believed either themselves 
or someone they knew had lost a job to an immigrants, citing immigrants as a burden to the U.S., 
supporting immigration decreases (61%), and viewing immigration as a major problem for the 
country. Interchangeable with economic anxiety and instability is the perception of wage 
suppression. Fear of economic instability leads to large numbers of Latino immigrants being 
viewed as a critical, very serious issue (Gallup, 2020; Pew Research Center, 2019). Job loss and 
economic anxieties aid in overestimating the number of immigrants, supporting anti-immigration 
rhetoric and political action. 
The narrative that immigrants are a burden on public resources such as medical care, 
SNAP for food insecure families, and public education system is rampant. According to Pew 
Research Center (2019), 37% of Americans believe Latino immigrants are likely to end up on 
welfare. An additional misperception is that Latino immigrants are a burden on the public 
education system. U.S.-born children and thus American citizens of immigrants were labeled 
‘anchor babies’, to portray how immigrant parents ‘used’ the birth of their child(ren) to stay 
locked to U.S. soil, avoiding deportation (Tirman, 2015; Kim et al., 2018; Foster, 2017) At the 
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academic level, the use of ESL (English as a Second Language) classes for students in various 
stages of learning the English language are often viewed with fear. This inclusion in education is 
often perceived as an ‘unwillingness’ to learn the language and as a ‘personal choice’ to be 
segregated with like ‘un-assimilating’ others (Carter, 2014).  
The Immigrant-Crime Paradox  
Prior research on the intersection of immigration and crime present a paradoxical position to 
common social and political discourse – either Latino immigration has no effect, a negative 
effect, or a weak association with crime (Fagan and Davies, 2012; Green, 2016; Leiva and Ponce 
Olivia, 2020; McCann and Boateng, 2020). Literature shows immigrants overall are not only less 
often incarcerated in the U.S. than born natives, they are also less likely to commit crimes 
(Cervantes et al., 2018). Existing literature correlates rates of violent crimes with rates of poverty 
and disadvantage. Higher rates of violent crime are also observed in areas where there are high 
rates disadvantage. Significantly excluded from most of the social safety net in the United States, 
oftentimes, Latino immigrants reside in places with existing high rates of economic 
disadvantage.  
Because most immigrants, including Latino immigrants, typically migrate to new 
locations without established social networks, they are more likely to live in places where high 
rates of disadvantage are present. Lumped together over mutual poverty, immigrants share a 
disproportionate amount of social demographics as groups that already contribute considerably 
to crime (Davies and Fagan, 2012). Oftentimes, this includes living in poverty in the same high-
risk, disadvantaged neighborhoods, working similar low-income jobs, and having limited skills 
for upward social mobility (Chouhy and Madero-Hernandez, 2019). Economic opportunities 
afforded to citizens are seldom available to immigrant groups, making the move up and out of 
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poverty difficult. Structural barriers faced by Latino immigrants include limited proficiency in 
English, fear of deportation, uncertain or unsteady employment, and low levels of education. 
Excluded from most government social safety net programs, immigrants face social isolation, 
along with discrimination and prejudice (Munger et al., 2014).  
Ironically, immigrants oftentimes become the victims of a crime and are at greater risk of 
victimization, such as hate crimes and sex crimes, all while facing social isolation due to 
language barriers (Davies and Fagan, 2012; Comino et al., 2020). 
The Current Study: Anti-immigration as the Focus of the 2016 Presidential Election  
Anti-immigration rhetoric continues to perpetuate the inaccurate narrative associating crime with 
immigration. Uniquely, the 2016 presidential election was arguably the first presidential election 
that actively targeted Latino immigrants, specifically. Referring to Latino immigrants during 
campaign speeches as “these people” and “bad hombres”, Donald Trump supporting rallied 
campaign cries of “shoot them”. Latino immigrants fleeing conflict and lawfully seeking asylum 
at the U.S.-Mexico border were labeled as an “invasion”. In response to the perceived immigrant 
invasion, “build the wall” became a chant at most campaign rallies and public speeches, insisting 
Mexico would be responsible for the cost of its erection (Washington Post, 2015; Chouhy and 
Madero-Hernandez; Winders, 2016; 2019; Phillips, 2017; Ross, 2016). Post-colonialized 
struggling nations became “shit-hole countries”, from which immigration was not considered 
economically advantageous to the United States (Washington Post, 2018; Blake, 2018; Laguerre, 
2018). 
Despite prior research and data that contradict this narrative, Latino immigrants 
continued to be associated and further blamed for rates of violent crimes, including rape. 
Declaring a state of emergency in 2019 to control ‘the growing threat at the border’, the Trump 
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administration secured $3.8 billion in Pentagon funding for a border wall between the United 
States and Mexico. Not only was the Latino threat narrative arguably the focus of this entire 
campaign, it was also expressed in policy. 
In 2017, the Trump administration announced its plan to terminate DACA (Deffered 
Action for Childhood Arrivals), which granted certain protections and opportunities to those 
brought to the U.S. as children. The termination of DACA aimed to stripped recipients of certain 
employment rights and protection from deportation (Hainmueller et al., 2017). 
In addition, the introduction of the Zero Tolerance Policy in 2018, Donald Trump’s 
administration paved the way for parent-child separations for the most vulnerable Latino 
immigrants. All of those seeking asylum and all undocumented immigrants were referred to the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) to be prosecuted. All children under the age of 18 were handed over 
to the U.S. Department of Health and Human services, resulting in over 4,300 separations with 
900 still waiting to be reunited as of 2021. (SPLC, 2020).  
Donald Trump’s infamous 2016 campaign speech summarizes the heightened immigrant-
crime narrative surrounding this election in particular: 
“When Mexico sends its people, they’re not sending their best. They’re not sending you. 
They’re not sending you. They’re sending people that have lots of problems, and they’re 
bringing those problems… They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re 
rapists. And some, I assume, are good people ... But I speak to border guards and they tell 
us what we’re getting ... They’re sending us not the right people” (Trump, 2016 cited in 
Chouhy and Madero-Hernandez, 2019). 
 
This repeated misleading narrative framing immigration as a determinant in predicting rates of 
violent crime was used to mobilize Republican voters during the 2016 presidential election, 
exacerbating widespread misperceptions and moral panic.  
On a humanistic level, this research is not just a Master’s Thesis -  it is personal for me 
and important to me. Growing up in the San Bernardino Valleys of Southern California, my peer 
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groups, social groups, neighbors, and educators were primarily Latino. The proximity of my 
hometown to the Mexican border at Tijuana is a grand total of 211 miles. I married into a Latino 
family, I have Afro-Latina daughters, and I speak Español. The Latino-criminal narrative 
exploded exponentially during Donald Trump’s 2016 campaign for president, targeting some of 
those dearest to my heart, encouraging discrimination, verbal assault, and even physical violence. 
It is important to me to be able to explore, through the use of data, research, and theory, how 
deep this narrative resonates with the public – if this narrative did in fact affect the way the 
majority of the United States voted in the 2016 presidential election.  
Methods  
Based on President Donald Trump’s 2016 speech assessing the characteristics of Latino 
immigrants, data were drawn from two sources. The first is 2015 data from the United States 
Census Bureau’s American Community Survey (ACS), which contains key poverty variables 
used in conducting this research. The second is 2016 county-level election data which contain 
voting tallies for both parties. These databases were merged using FIPS codes to create a single 
cohesive dataset for analysis.  
U.S. Census data were used to analyze whether county-level rates of Latino immigration 
or county-level rates of violent crime were significant in predicting county-level voting patterns 
net other predictors such as poverty pctpopnohs and pctpopunem, and racial diversity, entropy2. 
All analyses were conducted solely on the county-level. There were no missing cases in these 
datasets. Tolerance and VIF values in Table 4 indicate no issues of collinearity.  
Units of Analysis  
The units of analysis for this research are incorporated census places, representing populated 
areas that are (1) named, (2) recognized locally, and (3) not part of any existing place. These 
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places may or may not have powers, functions, and legally assigned limits. Although census 
places as units of analyses vary in size, crime rate, and in both demographic and social make-up, 
census places uniquely contribute to discourse surrounding immigration. Using census places to 
explore immigrant communities at the local, state, and national or regional level allows 
invaluable information regarding mobility, immigrant group sizes by region, rates of serious 
crimes, and affords for substantial statistical analyses. 
Dependent Variables 
The dependent variables for this research include percent of Latin American immigrants 
(pctfbla), diversity index (entropy2), violence index (violence_rate), percent of population 
unemployed over age 16 (pctpopunem), and percent of population without a high school degree 
(pctpopnohs) for each census place. Violence rate is an index containing multiple highly 
correlated types of violent crimes including counts for assault, robbery, rape, and homicide for 
each census place. Diversity is an index containing measures of ‘race’ including White, Black, 
Hispanic, and Asian.    
 Exploring the rates of violent crime at the level of the census place accounts for a 
majority of potential violent crime types addressed in the literature review section of this paper, 
including rape. The percentage of Latin American immigrants allows us to examine the statistical 
significance of Latino immigrant presence at the county level and its potential relationship to 
2016 Republican voting patterns. As described below, the variable entropy2 will control for 
racial diversity.  
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Additional Control Variables  
The first control variable entropy2 is an index measuring diversity and includes White, Black, 
Hispanic, and Asian where higher scores equate to racial heterogeneity and lower scores equate 
to more racial homogeneity.  
The second set of control variables, pctpopnohs and pctpopunem, measure the percent of 
the county-level population without a high school degree and the percent of the county-level 
population unemployed, respectively.  
Analytic Technique 
The purpose of this research is to explore the potential relationship between immigration, crime, 
and GOP voting patterns during the 2016 presidential election, controlling for predictors of 
poverty and racial heterogeneity. This analysis is three-fold. First, descriptive statistics are 
provided for each variable, including mean and standard deviation. 
 Second, simple bivariate correlations are provided across all variables used in the model, 
allowing exploration of the unique relationship between immigration and crime both before and 
after accounting for differences in predictors of poverty. These simple bivariate correlations 
afford for the direct exploration into the relationship between immigration and crime at the 
county-level in the United States. The goal in doing this is to speak in simpler terms regarding 
the relationship between the two, and more importantly, independent of any stakeholder 
discourse occurring external to empirical research. 
 Third, results from a series of hierarchical regression models are presented, predicting 
county-level GOP votes from the 2016 election, net other predictors of poverty such as the 
percent of the county without a high school degree and percent unemployment. This research 
began in January 2021 and was completed by the end of April 2021.  
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Results  
Descriptive Statistics  
Descriptive statistics have been provided for all independent and dependent variables in Table 1. 
The first column identifies the variable, while the next two columns present the corresponding 
means and standard deviations (n = 2959). We note several findings. 
First, the average county-level percent of Latino immigrants (M=47.58, SD=26.99), and 
average county-level rates of violent crime (M=1347.82, SD=996.32) vary greatly by census 
location. Second, overall average diversity, including White, Black, Hispanic, and Asian, ranges 
from approximately 17% to 56% (M=.38, SD=.20). The percent of the population with low 
education ranges from approximately 11% to 21%, which parallels the 2015 national average 
(M=14.51, SD=1.75); (Ryan et. al, 2015). Finally, unemployment rates, on average, are 
relatively low (M=4.51, SD=1.71), again, consistent with the 2015 national average (Kang and 
Williamson, 2016). 
Bivariate Associations  
We find negative weak-to-moderate associations between percent GOP vote and the predictors 
violence rate, diversity, and percent unemployment (r ranges from -.205 to -.473, p<.001). Next, 
regrading immigration, we find a weak positive relationship between Latino immigration and 
rates of violent crime (r= .061, p<.001).  
Altogether, before controlling for any key predictors of communities into which Latino 
immigrants settle, census places with higher percentages of  Latino immigrants tend to have 
higher rates of GOP votes, while census places with higher rates of diversity and violent crime 
tend to have lower rates of GOP votes. This  finding is important as the Latino Threat Narrative 
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and supporting rhetoric by Donald Trump in his infamous 2016 speech focus on the  criminal 
menace posed by immigrating Latinos.  
Third, the county-level percent of Latino immigrants is positively correlated with all other 
predictors from weak-to-moderate, including diversity (r=.416, p<.001), low education (r=.478, 
p<.001), and unemployment (r=.042, p<.001). Violence rate has consistent weak-to-moderate 
positive correlations with diversity, low education, and unemployment (r ranges from r=.131 to 
.338, p<.001).  
Fourth, as previously mentioned, the additional control predictors low education, rate of 
Latino immigration, unemployment, and diversity all have positive weak-to-moderate 
correlations. Diversity has a positive and moderate correlation with low education (r=.323, 
p<001), unemployment (r=.348, p<.001), and Latino immigration (r=.416, p<.001). Low 
education has a positive  weak-to-moderate correlation between the percent GOP votes (r=.127, 
p<.001), Latino immigration (r=.478, p<.001), violence rate (r=.131, p<.001), low education 
(r=.323, p<.001), and unemployment (r=.316, p<.001). Finally, unemployment has a positive 
weak-to-moderate correlation between Latino immigration, violence rate, diversity, low 
education, and unemployment (r ranges from .042 to .348, p<.001). 
Multivariate Models  
We conclude our primary analysis with a series of three hierarchical linear regression models 
displayed in Table 3. For each additional predictor set, we construct a new model: one containing  
the total percentage Latino immigrants and rate of violent crime to predict the percent of county-
level GOP votes (Model 1), a model that includes rate of Latino immigration, rate of violent 
crime and diversity index (Model 2), and a model containing rate of Latino immigration, rate of 
violent crime, diversity index, along with the additional set of control variables, unemployment 
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and low education (Model 3). Across all of these models, our interest is in (a) the direction and 
statistical significance of the relationship between 2016 GOP votes and percentage of Latino  
immigrants, coinciding with the Threat Narrative, as well as (b) whether there are any 
differences in 2016 GOP voting patterns net other key predictors.  
Table 3 provides the model summary for all three of our hierarchical regression models. 
Model 1 regression indicate the predictors violence rate and Latino immigration explain 
approximately 6.3% of the variance in 2016 county-level GOP votes (adjusted R2 =.063, 
F(2,2956)=100.451, p<.001). Retaining violence rate and Latino immigration, Model 2 contains 
the additional control variable diversity and increases the variance explained in 2016 county-
level GOP votes to 35.6% (adjusted R2=.356, F=(1, 2955)=1345.602, p<.001). The final model, 
Model 3, contains violence rate, Latino immigration, diversity, with the additional control 
variables unemployment and low education. The third and final model explains approximately 
42.5% of variance in 2016 county-level GOP votes (adjusted R2=.425, F=(177.21), p<.001). 
Table 4 provides the regression coefficients and significance for each model. For Model 
1, violence rate (β =-.214, p<.001) does a better job at explaining 2016 county-level GOP votes 
than Latino immigration (β=.147, p<.001). Explaining 6.3% of variance in 2016 county-level 
GOP votes, a one unit increase in percent of county-level Latino immigrants corresponds with 
a .001 increase in percent of 2016 county-level GOP votes. A one unit increase in county-
level violence rate corresponds with a 3.302E-5 decrease in 2016 county-level GOP votes. The 
regression equation for Model 1 is as follows: 
ŷ = .635x +.001 pctfbla – 3.302E-5 violence_rate 
 
For Model 2, the addition of the control variable diversity renders violence rate statistically 
insignificant in predicting 2016 county-level GOP votes (β=-.015, p=.341). Diversity now 
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explains the most variance (β=-.634, p<.001), followed by county-level percent of Latino 
immigrants (β =.398, p<.001). Explaining 35.6% of variance in GOP votes, a one unit increase 
in percent of county-level Latino immigrants corresponds with a .002 increase in county-level 
GOP votes. A one unit increase in county-level violence rate corresponds with a -2.313E-5 unit 
decrease in county-level GOP votes. A one unit increase in county-level diversity corresponds 
with a -.476 decrease in county-level GOP votes. The regression equation for Model 2 is as 
follows: 
ŷ = .705x +.002 pctfbla – 2.313E-6 violence rate -.476 entropy2  
 
For Model 3, the addition of the control variables low education and unemployment sees  
violence rate to be, once again, statistically insignificant in predicting 2016 county-level GOP 
votes (β=.1.776E-6, p=.447). Again, diversity explains the most variance (β=-.590, p<.001), 
followed by education (β =.265, p<.001), unemployment (β=-.234, p<.001), and Latino 
immigration (β=.262, p<.001). Model 3 explains approximately 42.5% of variance in 2016 
GOP votes, where a 1 unit increase in percent of county-level Latino immigrants corresponds 
with a .001 increase in county-level GOP votes. A one unit increase in county-level percent 
diversity corresponds with a -.590 decrease in percent of county-level GOP votes. A one unit 
increase in percent without a high school diploma (low education) corresponds with  a .006 
unit increase in county-level GOP votes. A one unit increase in county-level unemployment 
corresponds with a .021 unit decrease in county-level GOP votes. The regression equation for 
Model 3 is as follows: 





As revealed by Models 2 and 3, not only do places with higher percentages of Latino 
immigration tend to have lower levels of GOP votes, these locations also render rates of violent 
crime insignificant in predicting the occurrence of GOP votes. Furthermore, our models reveal 
that overall diversity (entropy2) conditions the relationship with GOP votes. Essentially, county-
level GOP votes, on average, were more likely to occur in places with not only higher rates of 
Latino immigrants, but in places with higher rates of low education. Inversely, county-level 
Democrat votes, on average, were more likely to occur in counties with higher rates of overall 
diversity, and higher rates of education (high school diploma attainment). 
Discussion and Conclusion 
Current literature documents the settling of Latino immigrants in U.S. communities and the 
relevant patterns that emerge, such as crime reduction, positive community building, and social 
interaction. Yet, an important gap remained. Hence, the focus of this research has been to 
examine to what extent the overall county-level presence of Latino immigrants and overall 
county-level rates of violent crime were significant in predicting GOP votes. In doing so, this 
research addressed what has become common rhetoric among policy makers and the public in 
general: the idea that Latino immigration is not only disadvantageous to the U.S. as a country, 
but poses a real threat to citizens’ safety and security. 
From our final analysis (Model 3) of near three-thousand census places across the United 
States, several key findings emerge. First, 2016 GOP votes were positively associated with 
county-level rates of Latino immigration, and county-level rates of low education. This suggests 
U.S. census places with higher rates of Latino immigration tended to vote GOP. In summary 
GOP votes were affected by county-level rates of low education and Latino immigration in our 
final model (Model 3), but not by county-level rates of violent crime, which becomes statistically 
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insignificant in Models 2 and 3, when controlling for other key predictors. It is important to note 
that low education, operationalized by the data as the percent of the county-level population age 
25 and older without a high school diploma, is positively associated with 2016 county-level GOP 
votes. 
Second, we find 2016 county-level GOP votes are negatively associated with diversity 
and rates of violent crime. For both Models 2 and 3, rates of violent crime becomes statistically 
insignificant when controlling for other predictors. Here we see 2016 county-level GOP votes 
were largely, on average, situated in homogenously saturated census locations with low rates of 
diversity. Furthermore, these census location also happen to be places with low overall 
education, identified by the county-level percent of the population age 25 and older without a 
high school diploma.  
Inversely, greater diversity in county-level populations was positively associated with 
voting democrat, as seen in Models 2 and 3. Overall, diversity explained the most amount of 
variation in 2016 county-level GOP votes. In both of Models 2 and 3, diversity (entropy2) had 
the largest Beta weights (-.634 and -.590, respectively). Additionally, census locations with more 
educated populations, those having at least a high school diploma, along with census places with 
higher rates of unemployment, were also more likely to vote democrat.  
Findings align closely with existing literature and support the supposition of the contact 
hypothesis, while rejecting the Latino Threat Narrative. The data from this research shows 
increased contact with unlike others, increased diversity, can lead to reduced fear, anxiety, 
prejudice, and discrimination, and thus, reduced likelihood of 2016 county-level GOP votes. As 
mentioned previously, this contact oftentimes begins at the micro level through community 
social interaction. Increased interaction with those unlike oneself typically results in more 
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tolerance, and perhaps, even tentative acceptance, of differences in areas such as language, 
culture, and ethnic origin. 
Findings reject the national discourse stimulated by Donald Trump promoting the 
narrative that Latino immigrants are dangerously violent criminals. The immigrant-crime 
paradox and supporting research in itself rejects the Latino Threat Narrative. In this rejection, 
support gathers for existing research for the immigrant-crime paradox. County-level GOP votes 
were predicted to occur more in places with less crime, again, rejecting narrative that Latino 
immigrants are dangerous and violently criminal. However, the presence of Latino immigrants, 
regardless of rates of violent crime, led to increased votes for Donald Trump. Although discourse 
surrounding the Latino Threat Narrative is factually and statistically inaccurate, data shows it 
continued to drive county-level GOP votes in the 2016 presidential election.  
This research has the potential to have implications in various fields of the social sciences 
and  public policy. Possible impacts on the fields of social science include accurate framing of 
historical narratives and increased education and promotion of diversity at both the micro and 
macro level. The acknowledgement from both major political parties in the U.S. of the immense 
power and effect of political rhetoric could also play a significant role in shifting to a more 
accurate narrative surrounding Latino immigration.  
This study answers the initial research question of how county-level rates of Latino 
immigration and county-level rates of violent crime affected 2016 presidential voting patterns. 
We found rates of violent crime to be either negatively associated, or statistically insignificant in 
predicting county-level GOP votes. Latino immigration was a significant factor across all models 
presented, even when controlling for other key predictors such as diversity, education, and 
unemployment. We conclude the that the presence of Latino immigrants, along with rates of low 
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educational attainment and homogenous social environments, not rates of violence crime, were 
actually associated with how these communities voted. 
Limitations and Directions for Future Research  
Consistent with prior research, our bivariate results clearly and in a simplistic fashion indicate 
that census places with larger relative Latino immigrant populations, and larger diversity overall, 
tend to have lower rates of GOP votes. Yet, this research has several key limitations, including 
future voting patterns, geographic location, race, and additional predictors of poverty. Future 
research might take into account region of the country where there are more racially homogenous 
census places, such as the U.S. South, or more ethnically heterogeneous census places, such as 
the U.S. West. Controlling for ‘race-specific’ variables in place of an overall diversity index may 
yield more insight into how ‘racial groups’ voted. As more data becomes available, it will be 
important for researchers to consider Latino immigration is framed in general, and its relation to 
policy.   
The data yielded interesting theoretical implications, as it coincides with existing data 
showing the Latino Threat Narrative to be fictitious in discourse, but existential in implication. 
Many policy makers and native-born U.S. residents must reconcile with the fact that immigrant 
communities are not as dangerous as the rhetoric suggests. Instead, diversity is linked to lower, 
not higher, rates of crime that enhances the protective effects of immigration more broadly.  
The results of this paper contributes theoretically to the discourse surrounding Latino 
immigration, crime, and voting, and, simultaneously leads to deeper and more pressing 
questions. If the mere presence of a Latino immigrants affects conservative voting and policy at 
the macro-level, what does this mean for this already marginalized population, both presently 
and in the future? 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for the independent variable and all dependent variables 
(n=2595). 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
per_gop .63025 .153604 2959 
% of FB pop that are Lat Am foreign born 47.5781 26.98967 2959 
Index violence rate per 100,000 1347.8196 996.31790 2959 
Diversity - standardized - W, B, H, Asian .37604 .204543 2959 
% of total pop. 25+ w/o high school degree 14.5081 6.50050 2959 




Table 2: Bivariate Correlations for the independent variable, per_gop, and all dependent variables (n=2959). 
 
per_gop % of FB pop that 
are Lat Am 
foreign born 
Index violence 
rate per 100,000 
Diversity - 
standardized - W, 
B, H, Asian 
% of total pop. 
25+ w/o high 
school degree 





per_gop 1.000 .134 -.205 -.473 .127 -.341 
% of FB pop that are Lat Am foreign 
born 
.134 1.00 .061 .416 .478 .042 
Index violence rate per 100,000 -.205 .061 1.000 .338 .131 .290 
Diversity - standardized - W, B, H, Asian -.473 .416 .338 1.000 .323 .348 
% of total pop. 25+ w/o high school 
degree 
.127 .478 31 .323 1.000 .316 
% of total population 16+ unemployed -.341 .042 .290 .348 .316 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) per_gop . .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
% of FB pop that are Lat Am foreign 
born 
.000 . .000 .000 .000 .012 
Index violence rate per 100,000 .000 .000 . .000 .000 .000 
Diversity - standardized - W, B, H, Asian .000 .000 .000 . .000 .000 
% of total pop. 25+ w/o high school 
degree 
.000 .000 .000 .000 . .000 
% of total population 16+ unemployed .000 .012 .000 .000 .000 . 
N per_gop 2959 2959 2959 2959 2959 2959 
% of FB pop that are Lat Am foreign 
born 
2959 2959 2959 2959 2959 2959 
Index violence rate per 100,000 2959 2959 2959 2959 2959 2959 
Diversity - standardized - W, B, H, Asian 2959 2959 2959 2959 2959 2959 
% of total pop. 25+ w/o high school 
degree 
2959 2959 2959 2959 2959 2959 
% of total population 16+ unemployed 2959 2959 2959 2959 2959 2959 
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Table 3: Model Summary containing variance explained by each model and overall model 
significance (n=2959). 
Model R R Square Adjusted R 
Square 





F Change df1 df2 Sig. F Change 
1 .252a .064 .063 .148686 .064 100.451 2 2956 .000 
2 .597b .357 .356 .123270 .293 1345.602 1 2955 .000 
3 .652c .426 .425 .116518 .069 177.211 2 2953 .000 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Index violence rate per 100,000, % of FB pop that are Lat Am foreign born 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Index violence rate per 100,000, % of FB pop that are Lat Am foreign born, Diversity - standardized - 
W, B, H, Asian 
c. Predictors: (Constant), Index violence rate per 100,000, % of FB pop that are Lat Am foreign born, Diversity - standardized - 




Table 4: Coefficients for Models 1, 2,and 3 predicting 2016 county-level GOP votes, net other key predictors (n=2959) 




















Partial Part Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) .635 .007 
 
97.587 .000 .622 .648 
     
% of FB pop that are 
Lat Am foreign born 
.001 .000 .147 8.237 .000 .001 .001 .134 .150 .147 .996 1.004 




.000 -.214 -12.013 .000 .000 .000 -.205 -.216 -.214 .996 1.004 
2 (Constant) .705 .006 
 
123.212 .000 .693 .716 
     
% of FB pop that are 
Lat Am foreign born 
.002 .000 .398 24.450 .000 .002 .002 .134 .410 .361 .820 1.220 




.000 -.015 -.953 .341 .000 .000 -.205 -.018 -.014 .878 1.139 
Diversity - standardized 
- W, B, H, Asian 
-.476 .013 -.634 -36.682 .000 -.502 -.451 -.473 -.559 -.541 .729 1.372 
3 (Constant) .726 .007 
 
100.638 .000 .711 .740 
     
% of FB pop that are 
Lat Am foreign born 
.001 .000 .262 15.160 .000 .001 .002 .134 .269 .211 .652 1.533 
Index violence rate per 
100,000 
1.776E-6 .000 .012 .760 .447 .000 .000 -.205 .014 .011 .847 1.180 
Diversity - standardized 
- W, B, H, Asian 
-.443 .013 -.590 -34.510 .000 -.469 -.418 -.473 -.536 -.481 .665 1.504 
% of total pop. 25+ w/o 
high school degree 
.006 .000 .265 15.685 .000 .005 .007 .127 .277 .219 .682 1.466 
% of total population 
16+ unemployed 
-.021 .001 -.234 -14.622 .000 -.023 -.018 -.341 -.260 -.204 .761 1.314 
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